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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATTI SIMONSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19148

ROBERT GORDON TRAVIS,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff against Defendant
for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident.
Because Plaintiff executed a release, the sole issue in this
appeal is the validity of the release and its effect upon
Plaintiff's claim.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-Respondent agrees with the statement conatined
in Appellant's Brief as to the procedural events occurring in
this case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's
decision of no cause of action based upon the validity of the
release executed by Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent essentially agrees with the statement of facts contained in the Brief of Appellant.

However,

Appellant has taken the liberty in some instances of drawing
inferences contrary to the lower court's decision and in
incorrectly characterizing the testimony of Defendant's
insurance adjuster.

For this reason, and for the purpose of

presenting the testimony in chronological order, Respondent
shall restate the factual proof.
The plaintiff was involved in a two-car intersection
accident at Roy, Utah on February 1, 1978.

Several days after

the accident she contacted Defendant's insurance company, State
Farm Insurance, concerning the damage to her car.

(Tr. 20).

Shortly thereafter, a State Farm adjuster went to Appellant's
home and made an estimate as to the amount of damage.
The estimate was for a total of $622.45.

(Tr. 21-22)

(Ex. 1).

Approximately five weeks subsequent to the accident the
plaintiff went to the State Farm claims office on Harrison
Boulevard and had a conversation with a secretary.

Plaintiff

testified that she refused to sign a release that had been
previously prepared by the adjuster Mr. Homer Randall.

Mr.

Randall was not present the day she first visited the State
Farm office.

(Tr. 25).

She examined a release that had been

previously prepared by Mr. Randall.

(Ex.

2).

She stated that

she could not recall whether the release contained a typewritten
clause above the printed form during this first visit.
-2-

(Tr. 31) .

Plaintiff testified that the secretary at State Farm told
her that she would have to sign the release if she wanted to
get the check for her car repair.

She recalled that upon reading

the release agreement that it "didn't sound right" because she
did not want to release everything.

She stated that the release

sounded like she was releasing all of her claims and not just
her property damage.

(Tr. 24).

During this period of time the plaintiff stated she was
going to a doctor for treatment from the accident but did not
know the extent of any injuries at that point in time.

(Tr. 23)

Plaintiff explained that because of her medical bills, her concern over her personal injuries, and the language contained in
the release form she refused to sign the document.

(Tr. 24).

It was her position that she had never agreed to release anything other than her claims for property damages.

Plaintiff

denied being told by the secretary that the property damage
claim could not be paid until all of the claims had been settled.
(Tr. 33).
Plaintiff recalled that the following day Mr. Randall called
her on the phone to ask her why she refused to sign the release.
She told him that she did not understand the release very good
and that it seemed like she was releasing everything including
her personal and medical claims.

She told him, according to her

testimony, that she only wanted the car taken care of and that
she was still seeing a doctor.

She related that she wanted her

medical bills and personal injuries kept open.
-3-

(Tr. 25-26).

She stated that Mr. Randall told her thc:lt the release was
only for her property damage but that

Randall never soeci-

fically mentioned any of the typed language contained in the
release.

He never related this language into his supposed

statement that the release was only covering property damage.
( Tr . 2 6 - 27 ) .
Mr. Randall, on the other hand, testified that he had

prepared the release on a standard form utilized by State Farm.
(Tr. 7).

The typed portion on the exhibit contained a standard

State Farm clause which was utilized at that time for the purpose
of preserving subrogation rights of a claimant's own no-fault
insurer.

(Tr. 8 , 12, 3 5) .

Randall stated that he personally filled out the handwritten
portion of the release.

(Tr. 8).

The amount of $622.45 was the

exact amount of the estimate for the property damage.

(Tr. 9)

Randall stated that he knew that the plaintiff was going to a
doctor but did not know whether the doctor had released her from
treatment.

He also knew that she was insured under her own no-

fault policy which would have covered all of her medical bills
up to a minimum of $2,000.

He did not know the limits of her

no-fault coverage but testified that most policies had no-fault
coverage limits in excess of $2,000.

(Tr. 12).

He stated that

in some cases you can estimate what the medical expenses of an
injured party will be five weeks after the accident while in
other cases you cannot.
While Mr. Randall recalled having a conversation with
-4-

the plaintiff concerning the release, he could not truthfully
state all of the substance of that conversation.

He did not

believe, however, that he could have told her that the release
was only for property damage and that she did not need to worry
about her other claims.

(Tr. 16).

He stated that as a standard

procedure he would tell all claimants that the release would
cover everything with the exception of the medical bills that
State Farm would have to pay to the claimant's own insurance
company.

He testified that if there was an arrangement to

only pay for the property damage that another type of form
would have been utilized rather than the release form used
in this instance.

(Tr. 35).

P.e explained that he would have

used an advanced cost receipt form if the property damage only
was being released.

He stated that the form actually signed

by Mrs. Simonson could not be used for that purpose and that
people would not sign it because it was a general release.

(Tr.

36) •

The day following her conversation with Mr. Randall, the
plaintiff went back to the State Farm office and signed the
exact form that she had previously refused to sign the day
before.

(Tr. 32).

The secretary on this day also informed

her that the release had to be signed in order for her to
receive a check for the property damage on the car.

(Tr. 33).

Plaintiff stated that she had never personally met Homer
Randall during any of these negotiations.

(Tr. 25).

She

explained that she signed the release simply because she trusted
-5-

Homer Randall and did not think he would lie to her.

(Tr.

32) .
During these negotiations Randall also agreed to pay an
additional amount for a car rental.

Accordingly, a second

draft for $31.50 was given to the plaintiff on March 15, 1978.
(Ex. 5).

In addition to the $622 paid to the plaintiff for her

automobile repair, State Farm also paid to Plaintiff's insurance
carrier approximately $2,100 as reimbursement for their expenditures under Plaintiff's no-fault insurance policy.

(Tr. 37) .

Plaintiff stated that her overall medical bills exceeded
$5,000.

Some of those bills had been paid by her no-fault

carrier and by her own health insurance carrier, Blue Cross.
She did not, however, submit many of the bills to Blue Cross
and could not submit them at the time of trial because of
untimeliness.

(Tr. 29).

Finally, Plaintiff testified that she had retained all of
the money paid to her by State Farm and had not made any effort
to give the money back after asserting that the release did not
cover medical costs and personal injuries.

(Tr. 30).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN RCLING
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO INVALIDATE THE RELEASE.
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in requiring
her to carry the burden of proof in invalidating the release.
-6-

According to Plaintiff, it was Defendant's obligation to
utilize the release as an affirmative defense to Plaintiff's
lawsuit and was therefore incumbent upon the defendant to prove
the validity of the release.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 11-13) .

This argument is erroneous.
It is fundamental that once a party relying upon a release
establishes the execution of the release by the other party,
that the burden is on the releasor to show by clear and convincing evidence that the release should be set aside.
\'latkins,
P.2d 1156

Witt v.

579 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1978); Fieser v. Stinnette, 509
(Kan. 1973).

This Court in Maxfield v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., 330 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1958) followed this rule and
stated that one who attacks a release of liability has the
burden of proving its invalidity.

In addition, "Under Utah

law, in order to overcome the effect of a release or other
written instrument, the contrary evidence must be clear and
convincing."

(Id. at 1019).

A review of the record shows that Plaintiff failed to
meet this burden.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD EXECUTED A GENERAL
RELEASE.
Appellant argues in her brief that the release executed
by

the plaintiff was only a conditional release which did not
-7-

include claims for personal injuries or meJical expenses.

She

cites various rules of contractual construction arquing that
the release either clearly excludes these types of claims or,
in the alternative, that the release is ambiguous and requires
parole evidence.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 14-18).

Respondent agrees that the document is unambiguous as a
matter of law and that it is definitely a general release of
all claims.

As noted by Appellant herself, all of the provisions

of a release must be construed together.
17) .

(Appellant's Brief, p.

If the interpretation now given to the typed language by

Appellant is correct then the majority of the language contained
in the printed form has no effect.

In other words, if the typed

language exempts claims for personal injuries and medical expenses
from the release, it is entirely inconsistent with the printed
language which includes all claims "both to personal and property."
An examination of this document as a whole shows that it
is not inconsistent and that both the printed form and the typed
portion are concerned with independent matters.

The printed

form, with ink insertions contained in parentheses, states the
following:
For the sole consideration of ($622.45) the
receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged,
the undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges
(Robert G. Travis) and (his) heirs, executors, administrators, agents and assigns, and all other persons,
firms or corporations liable or who might be claiwed
to be liable, none of whom admit any liability to the
undersigned but all expressly deny any liability,
from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions,
causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature
whatsoever, and particulary on account of all injuries,
-8-

known and unknown, both to person and property, which
have resulted or may in the future develop from an
accident which occurred on or about the (1st) day of
(February, 1978) at or near (5700 South 1900 West, Roy,
Utah .
Undersigned hereby declares that the terms of
this settlement have been completely read and are fully
understood and are voluntarily accepted for the purpose
of making a full and final compromise adjustment and
settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise,
on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned,
and for the express purpose of precluding forever any
further or additional claims arising out of the aforesaid accident.
Undersigned hereby accepts draft or drafts as final
payment of the consideration set forth above.
(Ex. 2).
(Emphasis added) .
There can be no doubt that the language contained in the
release related to all types of claims both for property damage
and for personal injuries.

Plaintiff herself admitted that when

she read the release it "sounded like she was releasing everything."
(Tr. 24).

The printed release form, therefore, contains all of

the elements of a general release.
The typed clause above the printed portion of the release
is not inconsistent.

It states the following:

The undersigned is not releasing any part of
his claim for which he has received or will in the
future receive payments under personal injury
protection insurance available to him.
The present
or future subrogation rights of any insurer for
making payments under such coverage is reserved.
(Emphasis added).
This clause simply states that any sum received by the
claimant pursuant to his own personal injury protection
insurance policy is not released and that his insurance carrier
reserves any present or future subrogation right to be reimbursed
-9-

for that amount.

The fact that the terms "personal injury

protection insurance" and the term "such coverage'' is utilized
in this clause clearly indicates the interpretation just recited
rather than the notion of Appellant that this clause exempted
personal injuries from the terms of the general release.
Moreover, even if the release were deemed ambiguous,
thereby allowing parol evidence to be admitted, there was no
showing that Plaintiff had any understanding whatsoever of this
clause or that she relied upon its insertion into the release
form.

Plaintiff could not recall when the clause was inserted

and never attempted to state what she believed its intent to be.
The document, on its own face, therefore, is a complete
bar to Plaintiff's action in the absence of showing of mutual
mistake, fraud or other equitable grounds to defeat the clear
meaning of the language.

Appellant failed to meet this burden

as will be discussed infra.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDitlG
CONSIDERATION FOR A GENERAL RELEASE.

While the lower court did not make a specific finding
of consideration for the release, the finding of such consideration was implied.

Appellant argues, however, that since Plain-

tiff was only paid the same amount as the estimated damage to
her property that she therefore had no consideration for the
release of her personal injury claims.

Appellant then argues

that because of the inadequacy of the consideration the general
-10-

release cannot be said to extend to personal injuries and
special damages.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 20-21).

Such an

argument is without merit.
A release is a surrender of a claim which may be given
for less than full consideration or even gratuitously.
v. Mowery, 418 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1966)
of the release itself received $622.

DeNike

Plaintiff by the terms
Certainly, by any standard

this sum of money was itself adequate to support consideration
of the agreement.
Appellant forgets that while State Farm Insurance believed
that its insured was probably responsible for the accident, it
had no obligation to pay for the property damage until a complete
and thorough investigation had been conducted or, in the extreme,
until the matter had been litigated and a judgment rendered.
State Farm agreed to short cut this procedure and to pay the
property damage sum immediately.
Plaintiff may at the time have thought her injuries were
minimal, that she suffered no compensable injuries, and that
her own insurance carrier would cover all of her medical and
lost wages expenses.

Plaintiff obviously wished to receive the

compensation for her automobile's damage immediately without
further delay.

State Farm, on the other hand, agreed to pay

this amount immediately upon the condition that she would make
no future claims of any nature against it.

These bargained for

promises together with the consideration of the actual monetary
amount was sufficient to sustain the adequacy of the considera-11-

I!

tion for the release.
Clearly, both parties received a benefit and both parties
suffered a detriment.

It was not necessary that Plaintiff be

allotted a certain consideration for each of her possible
claims arising from the accident.

The lower court decision was

not in error.
: I
I'

POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING RELATING
TO TENDER IS
BASIC TO THE ISSUES
RAISED ON THIS APPEAL.
The lower court noted in its Findings of Fact that since
executing the release of March 8, 1978 the plaintiff had retained
all of the consideration she received as a condition of giving
the release.

(Tr. 38).

Appellant argues extensively that this

finding as to tender invalidated the court's decision of a valid
release.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 22-24).

Respondent does not believe that the finding of tender is
relevant to this appeal.

Certainly, it is undisputable that

Plaintiff did not tender back any amount of the money she receive
from State Farm.

As such, the finding of fact is correct.

Respondent has never contended that the failure to tender
these amounts was the basis for the court's decision in finding
the release to prohibit Plaintiff from making any further claims.
The question of tender normally goes to ratification of an act.
The fact that Plaintiff failed to tender any amount during the
numerous years between the execution of the agreement and the
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corrunencement of the lawsuit would be some evidence of her
ratification of the release agreement but certainly would not
be conclusive for sustaining the court's finding of validity
of the release.

There is no evidence that the lower court

relied upon the failure to tender as the sole basis for the
decision and therefore any discussion as to the requirement of
a tender in this type of situation is merely academic.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ANY CLAIM OF FRAUD
IN THE EXECUTION OF THE RELEASE AND THE
LOWER COURT DECISION UPHOLDING THE
RELEASE IS THEREFORE CORRECT.
This Court has held on numerous occasions that evidence of
fraud must be clear, precise and indubitable and must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence.

Kelley v. Salt Lake Trans-

portation Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941); In re Swan Estate v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956).
The record in this case does not support any claim of
Plaintiff that she was fraudulently induced to execute the
release now in contention.

The basis of any claim she can now

assert is that she was tricked by Mr. Randall into signing the
release form.

This claim by Plaintiff is contradicted by not

only the language contained in the release itself but by the
testimony of Mr. Randall and the circumstances surrounding the
release.
The plaintiff admitted that the release clearly told her
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that she was waiving all of her rights by sioning it.

She made

her "change of mind" upon a telephone conversation with Randall
who allegedly assured her that the release did not mean what it
really said.

Plaintiff herself never claimed that Randall

told her that the typed language at the top of the release
agreement cancelled out the other language at the bottom.
In fact, she could not recall whether the typed language was
present even before she spoke with Randall.
While Randall could not recall the specifics of the conversation per se, he stated that he did recall talking to the
plaintiff and that he was sure he would have given her the same
answer that he told all claimants concerning the release form.
Plaintiff produced no evidence showing any motive why Randall
would want to misrepresent or trick the plaintiff into signing
the release.

Randall's testimony was completely consistent

that he would never have told her that the release covered only
property damage and was in direct contradiction to any claim
made by the plaintiff.
It is always a question for the trier of fact to determine
whether a Plaintiff sustains the burden of proof in attacking
a release on grounds of fraud.
(Wash. 1968).

Ketchum v. Wood, 438 P.2d 596

It is also the perogative of the trier of fact

to determine the weight to be given the testimony of witnesses
and wherever there is any circumstance which reasonably provides
a basis for refusing to find in accordance with a witness' testimony the trier of fact may do so.
-14-

One element which may be so

considered is the interest of the witness.

Aagard v. Dayton &

Miller Ready Mix Concrete Co., 361 P.2d 522 (Utah 1961).
In Melvin v. Stevens, 458 P.2d 977 (Ariz. 1969) the exact
type of claim was asserted.

In that case the plaintiff contended

that the adjuster told her that signing the release was only
for the damage to her car alone.

The adjuster claimed that

while he advised the plaintiff to wait awhile and see what
developed as to her injury that she nevertheless chose to go
ahead and sign the release to get the money for a new car.
The Arizona court stated:
It is not within our province to determine
whether the conversation as described by Reece
(the adjuster) took place; that was purely a
question of fact to be determined by the trial
judge and he evidently found it to be true.
We cannot reverse his decision under these facts.
at 980).
The trial court in the instant case could also have considered evidence that was not produced by the plaintiff.

For

example, Plaintiff introduced no evidence showing that she
ever attempted to submit medical claims to State Farm after the
release had been signed.

Since she testified that she believed

the release only covered property damage, the question could be
asked why she did not submit her excess medical bills to State
Farm for payment.

The record shows that the only notification

of any claim against the release was the actual filing of the
lawsuit over two years after the release had been signed.
Respondent submits that not only was there failure of
clear and convincing proof of fraud but there was a failure of
-15-

any proof of fraud.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff

some five weeks after the accident elected to immediately
receive her payment for the property damage to her automobile.
The lower court could have believed that she was upset when
she learned she had to give up all claims against State Farm
in order to receive this amount but she later decided to execute
the release anyway based upon her assumption that her own
insurance carrier would cover her expenses and that she was not
seriously harmed.
It should be noted here that the plaintiff failed to
produce any evidence as to the exact extent of her injuries at
the time the release was signed or the amount of medical bills
that she had expended at that time.

The lower court could

correctly infer that this failure to produce evidence showed
that while Plaintiff knew she had sustained some injury from the
accident she did not believe it was very serious and therefore
agreed to execute the release to expedite her property damage
claim.
Thus, the facts and evidence in this case show no clear
and convincing proof that Plaintiff was fraudulently induced into
executing the release.

It was the lower court which was able

to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to decide the
sincerity and truthfulness of this testimony.

This conclusion

should not be upset by this Court in the absence of clear abuse
or misapplication of the law.
(Utah 1967).
-16-

Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Utah statutes and insurance
resulations create a confidential relationship which somehow
shifts the burden of proof in these types of cases. This
argument is completely irrelevant to this appeal.
First, unlike the California case cited by Appellant
(Appellant's Brief, p. 27) no action has ever been initiated
against either State Farm Insurance Co. or the adjuster.

Second,

the regulations upon which Plaintiff relies were not even in
effect at the time of the events of this case as admitted by
Appellant herself.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 30).

Finally, to equate the role of Mr. Randall in this case
to that of a confidential advisor is completely baseless.

For

example, in the In re Swan Estate case cited by Appellant
(Appellant's Brief, p. 28)

a close friend and attorney drafted

the will of the deceased and named himself as a beneficiary.
This type of a relationship can hardly be said to exist in the
instant case.
Here, Mr. Randall was an insurance agent representing the
defendant who collided with Plaintiff in the automobile accident.
There was no contractual relationship existing between Randall
and the plaintiff.

Furthermore, Plaintiff had not even personally

met Randall but only spoke with him on the telephone.

The evi-

dence does not support any finding of a close personal relationship of trust and confidence.
Respondent agrees that insurance agents have duties to both
their own insured and to adverse parties.
-17-

Respondent readily

admits that any insurance agent 11ho is

of 1vrongdoing

should be disciplined by the insurance industry or by the state.
It may even be, as Appellant now asserts, that some type of
civil cause of action could be asserted based upon the newly
enacted regulations and statutes.

However, the present appeal

does not involve any such fraudulent or unethical conduct nor
does the present state of the law allow any such civil action
being maintained.
The presumptions and burdens in this type of case are clear.
Appellant's attempt to shift these presumptions and to claim
an undue influence is neither legally nor factually supported
in this record.
The lower court was correct in concluding that the plaintiff failed to meet her obligation in proving any of the defenses
asserted against a general release form.

As such, the release

was binding and Plaintiff was precluded from maintaining this
action.
CONCLUSION

Without being melodramatic, it is fundamental that written
documents maintain their integrity if the economic and legal
system is to function.

It is for this reason that extreme high

standards have been established by courts if a party is to set
aside a written document and to take a position directl

contrary

to it.
The release in this case is clear, as a matter of law,

-18-

and prevents Plaintiff from now asserting a claim against
Defendant for personal injuries and medical expenses.

Plain-

tiff herself knew of the consequences of signing such a document and was aware of the language of the document from her
own admitted testimony.
It was up to the trial court to decide whether Plaintiff
sustained her '.:lurden in 0•1erturning the effect of this agreement.
It was the trial court which heard the testimony of all the
witnesses and which had the opportunity of observing their
demeanor during testimony.

While Plaintiff can certainly

argue the facts to show an alleged misrepresentation, Defendant
can argue the facts to show that no such misrepresentation
occurred.

The trial court was the exclusive judge of this

testimony together with all inferences and implications
arising from the acts and omissions of the parties.
The lower court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the
release was invalid.

The lower court sustained the validity of

the written document based upon a full evidentiary hearing.
Respondent submits that this decision was correct and therefore
it should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

I
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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